The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of the difference between analytical methodologies for seismic probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), especially the difference in the probability of system failures and core damage sequences. We selected two methods, upper bound approximation (UBA) using minimal cut sets and direct quantification using Monte Carlo simulation (DQFM) for comparison. The former is often used in PSA for both internal and external event. The latter is developed in Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) as a part of SECOM2, a system reliability analysis code for seismic PSA, and expanded to divide the core damage state into different core damage sequences. The result showed that there is a significant difference between UBA method and DQFM method.
Introduction
Potential risk of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) has been assessed widely to identify the vulnerability of NPPs since WASH-1400 1 was reported. The risk of NPPs is classified under internal risk and external risk, and the external risk includes seismic risk. Since many NPPs are on the Pacific Ring of Fire, seismic PSA has been conducted to evaluate the seismic risk in terms of core damage frequency (CDF) of NPPs due to earthquakes [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . Also in Japan, many NPPs are exposed to the seismic risk due to the active faults on the Pacific Ring of Fire. The standard ground motion and the "Residual Risk" due to exceeding the standard ground motion are covered in the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities revised in September 2006 8 . The "Residual Risk" means reduced (in this case, by reviewing effort for seismic design) but remaining risk. The revised regulatory guide says that the existence "Residual Risk" should be recognized well and a reasonably achievable deal of effort should be put into reducing the risk. From this point of view, seismic PSA has been conducted. For example, seismic PSA has been conducted in JAEA for a hypothetical BWR plant 9 and an evaluation code system SECOM2 (Seismic Core Melt frequency Evaluation Code, version 2) was developed [10] [11] for this purpose. In addition, a part of the SECOM2 code system was available to the public as the SECOM2-DQFM (Direct Quantification of Fault tree using Monte Carlo simulation) code 12 . Furthermore, CDF has been analyzed in detail via accident sequences analysis and importance analysis. The outcomes of these analyses are to understand the vulnerable point in the plant system(s), and to take measures to mitigate the vulnerable point through changes in the operating procedures and the plant design.
In this study, SECOM2-DQFM is expanded to enable accident sequence analysis, then the result is compared to the result by upper bound approximation method using Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs), and the effect of overestimation is examined in detail.
Analytical Methodology for Seismic PSA

Probability of Component Failure
In many seismic PSA such as the seismic PSA conducted in JAEA 9 , response of a component is expressed by the peak ground acceleration of the component due to potential seismic ground motion. Capacity of the component is a measure of the strength of the component in response to the acceleration. The response and capacity are used to calculate failure probability of the component. When the response of the component (R) exceeds the capacity of the component (S), probability of component failure, P f is expressed as follows,
where R and S are assumed to be distributed log-normally, the medians are R m and S m , and the corresponding standard deviations are β R and β S . β R is called uncertainty of the response, and β S is called uncertainty of the capacity. In general, these uncertainties are divided in two factors, uncertainty due to randomness which is called aleatory uncertainty, and uncertainty due to lack of knowledge which is called epistemic uncertainty. These two kinds of uncertainties are combined using Square Root of the Sum of Squares (SRSS) by the following equations,
where β Rr is aleatory uncertainty of response, β Ru is epistemic uncertainty of response, β Sr is aleatory uncertainty of capacity, and β Su is epistemic uncertainty of capacity. When a new variable Z = S / R is introduced, Z could also be distributed log-normally. Z m , the median of Z and β Z , the standard deviation of Z are expressed by the following equation,
Component failure occurs when Z is greater than 1.0 (Z>1.0) by introduction of variable Z. In addition, natural logarithm of Z (ln(Z)) has a normal distribution, and the component fails when ln(Z) is less than 0.0(ln(Z)<0.0). Therefore, probability of component failure is expressed by the following equation,
The Eq. (6) is transformed to the following equation by variable replacement.
Pf can be calculated by the following equation using error function,
where α is acceleration at the component due to seismic ground motion, R m (α) and Pf(α) are the functions of α, and Erf(x) is the error function as follows.
( )
Analytical Methods for Conditional System Failure Probability
In general, system failure is expressed by using Fault Tree (FT) which consists of logic gates and basic events (i.e. which model component failure modes) in the PSA model. In the internal event PSA, probability of system failure is usually calculated once. But in the seismic PSA, probability of system failure is calculated for each level of seismic ground motion since the probability of component failure changes depending on the seismic ground motion as described above. Therefore, the probability is conditional on the seismic ground motion.
There are three general methods to calculate the conditional probability of system failure. The first method is based on the truth table 13 . The exact probability of system failure is obtained by this method. But the combination of all events (i.e. success or failure) in truth table could exceed limitation of calculation environment (e.g. amount of memory) easily, since the number of combination becomes 2 N where the number of basic events is N in the system. In addition, correlation between basic events (i.e. correlation between responses, correlation between capacities) could not considered by this method. The method using Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) 14 is one of the methods based on truth table.
Another general method is the use of Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs), which is generally used for many applications of PSA. MCSs are minimal combinations of basic events which induce a top event in FT. The number of MCSs is also minimized by laws of absorption in Boolean algebra. At first, probability for each MCS is calculated as the product of probabilities for all basic events in the MCS. There are some methods for summation of the probabilities for MCSs. For example, system reliability analysis code SEISIM (Seismic Evaluation of Important Safety Improvement Measures) which is developed for Seismic Safety Margins Research Program (SSMRP) 15 conducted in U.S. could calculate the summation of the probabilities by the following 3 equations, ( )
where k is the number of MCSs, P(MCSi) is the probability for i-th MCS, τ is all combinations selecting 2 of MCSs from all of MCSs. The Eq. (10) is called rare event approximation which simply sums up the probabilities of MCSs. But the probability by this equation is an overestimation since the intersection between MCSs are counted over and over again. The union of MCS A and MCS B is calculated as P(A) + P(B) by this equation, where the intersection of A and B should be subtracted from P(A) + P(B). The Eq. (11) considers the subtractions of the intersections between 2 events, which is called Hunter's upper bound approximation. But the equation subtracts only the intersections between 2 events, and does not subtract intersections between 3 events or more from the summation. The Eq. (12) is generic Upper Bound Approximation (UBA), which considers the subtractions of the intersections between all events from the summation. This equation is used as the first method in this report. The last general method is based on Monte Carlo simulation. One of the methods, DQFM method 11 is used in this study for comparison with the UBA method. The calculation procedure for occurrence probability of top event by DQFM method is shown in Figure 1 . When core damage is the top event in the FT, the probability calculated by the procedure is Core Damage Probability (CDP). DQFM method was developed to consider correlation between responses and between capacities of components, and it can also consider the intersection between basic events which are independent or correlated. The exact probability of system failure can be obtained by DQFM method as well as the methods using a truth table. There is error due to generation of random number, but the error can be reduced by increasing the number of iterations as with the other methods using Monte Carlo simulation. The generation procedure of random numbers for responses and capacities is described as follows.
(1) At first, a random number X i is generated based on the continuous uniform distribution defined by the two parameters, 0 and 1, which are its minimum and maximum values. ( 2) The random number X i is transformed to the random number Y i based on the standard normal distribution Φ(x) as follows.
The random number Y i based on the standard normal distribution is obtained using
which is the inverse function of Φ(x), by the following equation.
(3) The random number Y i is transformed to the random numbers, S i and R i based on the log-normal distribution. The random numbers, S i and R i are obtained using the random number Y i by the following equation,
where S mi is the median of capacity for i-th component, β Si is the standard deviation of capacity for i-th component, R mi is the median of response for i-th component, and β Ri is the standard deviation of response for i-th component. The steps above is the procedure for seismically induced component failure, but it can be applied to non-seismically induced random component failure by changing some parameters in the equations. The random number for the pseudo capacity is generated using the Eq. (15) setting S mi =1 and β Si =1, as follows.
For the pseudo response, Random failure probability C i is applied to the Eq. (16) instead of the random number X i setting R mi =1 and β Ri =1, as follows.
The above S i and R i obtained by the Eq. (17) and (18) are compared and failure occurs if R i is greater than S i . The failure condition is generated randomly based on given failure probability since comparing S i and R i is equal to comparing continuous uniform distribution defined by the two parameters 0 and 1, and the given failure probability C i .
Occurrence Probability of Accident Sequences
In general, Accident sequences are defined using event trees. There are a few methods to calculate occurrence probability of accident sequences. For example, occurrence probability of an accident sequence is calculated by multiplying conditional split fractions which are obtained with the conditions of success or failure at earlier branches on the path of the accident sequence in the event tree. This method is called the event tree linking (ETL). In another method called the fault tree linking (FTL), Boolean algebra for an accident sequence is obtained by the logical combination of fault trees for all branches on the path of the accident sequence in the event tree.
In this study, the FTL method is used for accident sequence analysis. For example, Boolean algebra is used to obtain MCSs in UBA method. MCSs are commonly composed of only failure events and there is no success events in MCSs. But for seismic PSA, success probability is not 1.0 since failure probability sometimes increases to almost 1.0 as seismic ground motion increases. For this reason, we multiplied the success probabilities for each success branches (i.e. 1.0 -failure probabilities) to the occurrence probability of the accident sequence. On the other hand, DQFM method is expanded to divide the core damage state into different core damage sequences in this study. The expansion allows us to use Boolean algebra to define an accident sequence instead of evaluating the top event of fault tree in Fig. 1 . The Boolean algebra expression of the accident sequence is obtained by the logical combination of failures and successes (i.e. not failures) of fault trees for all branches in the path of the accident sequence in the event tree. This expansion allows us to calculate exact occurrence probability of accident sequences.
Occurrence Frequency of Accident Sequences
In seismic PSA, seismically induced Frequency of an event is calculated from conditional occurrence probability of the event and seismic hazard. The objective event can be the occurrence of system failure, accident sequence, or core damage, etc. When the objective event is set to an accident sequence, occurrence frequency of the accident sequence ASF is obtained by two variables as follows,
where α is the level of seismic ground motion, ASP(α) is the conditional occurrence probability of the accident sequence at the level α, H(α) is seismic hazard expressed as the annual frequency of exceedance, which means how often the seismic ground motion exceeding the level α occurs. When the level α is discretized with the width ∆α, the Eq. (19) can be rewrited to the following equation,
where α j (j=1 to n) are the points of the discretization, H'(α j ) is annual frequency per gal(i.e. the unit of acceleration) obtained as follows.
where H(α j -∆α/2) is annual frequency of exceedance at the midpoint between the level α j-1 and α j , H(α j + ∆α/2) is annual frequency of exceedance at the midpoint between the level α j and α j+1 , they can be obtained by interpolation.
Model Description
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of overestimation of risk due to the upper bound approximation, and not to estimate the seismic risk at specific NPP. In this study, we use a hypothetical plant model which was the same as that used for seismic PSA study of the Model plant 9 . A description of this model is as follows. This model simulates 1100MWe BWR5 plant with Mark-II type containment which is one of the most popular type of NPP in Japan. The NPP is assumed to be located at a site on the Pacific coast of the northeastern area of Japan.
Five initiating events, i.e. RPV (reactor pressure vessel) rupture, large LOCA (loss of coolant accident), medium LOCA, small LOCA, LOSP (loss of offsite power) were considered in this model. These initiating events are treated in the hierarchy event tree considering the consequence due to each initiating event as shown in Fig. 2 . The first initiating event, RPV rupture is assumed to lead directly to core damage. The mitigation systems such as ECCSs (emergency core cooling systems) are available for the other 4 initiating events, as shown in Fig. 3 through Fig. 6 . These figures are event trees defining accident sequences for each initiating event. The explanation of the characters used for these sequences is shown in Table 1 . In addition, fault trees for each mitigation system and the parameters for basic events (i.e. random failure probability, design response and capacity) used in the Model plant were also adopted in this study. Table 1 Meaning of the characters used in Fig. 3 -Fig. 6 
Results
Effect on Probability of System Failure
The calculated conditional probability of HPCS system failure is shown in Fig. 7 . The curve of failure probability (i.e. fragility curve) based on the DQFM method agrees with the curve based on the UBA method. HPCS has no redundant components modeled in the system. There is one more system, RCIC which has no redundant components modeled in the system. The results for RCIC based on two methods also have the same curves as shown in Fig. 8 . On the other hand, there are some systems which have 2 trains. For example, EPS is modeled as 2 trains which are composed of DGs and the other associated components. The probability of EPS failure is shown in Fig. 9 . The probability of system failure is calculated by the 2 methods, DQFM and UBA. The probability calculated by UBA is 1.5 times greater than the one by DQFM at 900 gal. The maximum difference in the probability of failure is 0.26 at 1100 gal. Similar difference in the failure probability can be seen for the other systems which have 2 trains, such as ADS which is modeled as a 2-train system. The ADS system is composed of batteries, control boards, and the other components, as shown in Fig.  10 . Here a simple example is used for the explanation of these results. Consider a single train system that is composed of the components X1, X2, and X3. The MCSs of the system failure are X1, X2, and X3 , and then the system failure is analyzed with the Eq. (12) of UBA method, as follows. Drawing a venn diagram of 3 events, X1, X2, and X3 makes it easy to understand that the intersections between 3 events are adequately considered with the equation. 1 P(MCS ) P(X1) P(X2) P(X3) P(X1)P(X2) P(X1)P(X3) P(X2)P(X3) P(X1)P(X2)P(X3)
For a simple example of a 2-train system, the model assumes that train-A is composed of the components X1 and X2, train-B is composed of component X3. The MCSs of the system failure are X1X3 and X2X3, and the system failure is analyzed with Eq. (12) of the UBA method. The 3rd term in the following equation is multiplied by X3 twice. The probability based on the equation is an overestimation since the 3rd term is calculated to be smaller by X1X2X3 which is the actual intersection of X1X3 and X2X3. 
To see the difference between the 2 methods in the case of a 3-train system, the systems for reactor trip, i.e. CRD and SLC are selected and the system failure probability is calculated as shown in Fig. 11 . It shows that the difference becomes bigger when the order of redundant systems increases.
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Effect on Occurrence Probability of Accident sequences
Conditional core damage probabilities based on DQFM and UBA method are shown in Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 , respectively. The conditional CDP based on UBA method exceeds 1.0 in most cases, while the conditional CDP based on DQFM method never exceed 1.0. Essentially, probability can not exceed 1.0, and the failure probability calculated with a fault tree based on UBA method is over-estimated but does not exceed 1.0 as shown in Fig.7 to Fig. 11 . The effect of overestimation remains in a conditional occurrence probability of accident sequences which is obtained by multiplying some over-estimated probabilities of failure or success. When the over-estimated conditional occurrence probabilities of accident sequences are summed up to conditional CDP, it can exceed 1.0. LOSP is selected from the initiating events, and the conditional CDP induced by LOSP is divided into conditional occurrence probabilities of accident sequences defined by the ET in Fig. 6 . Conditional occurrence probabilities of accident sequences based on DQFM and UBA method is shown in FIg. 14 and 15 , respectively. Conditional occurrence probabilities of accident sequences by UBA method are greater than those by DQFM method because of the overestimation of some of the system failure probability in UBA method. But the conditional occurrence probabilities are not equally over-estimated for each accident sequence. For example, conditional occurrence probability of TBC(i.e. the most severe accident sequence which brings station blackout and reactor trip failure) is over-estimated to a greater extent than the other accident sequences at high level of seismic ground motion in this result. 
Effect on Occurrence Frequency of Accident sequences
Occurrence frequency of accident sequences can be obtained with the Eq. (19) which multiplies seismic hazard and conditional occurrence probability of accident sequences shown in the section 4.2, and then integrates them for all of seismic ground motion levels. Accident sequences and their occurrence frequencies for the 2 methods are listed in Table 2 . In general, occurrence frequencies of accident sequences by the UBA method are higher than those by the DQFM method. But the degree of overestimation is not uniform, and it depends on the accident sequence. Therefore, the rankings of some accident sequences are different between the 2 methods.
CDF at each seismic ground motion level is obtained by multiplying the conditional CDP and seismic hazard. Contribution to total CDF is the most around 600gal in both methods as shown in Table 3 . The difference between the 2 methods in occurrence frequencies of accident sequences around 600gal is relatively small as shown in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 . If CDF at higher seismic ground motion level contributes more to total CDF, the difference of the ranking of accident sequences between the 2 methods could be larger than the current result. Table 2 Dominant accident sequences and the occurrence frequency   Table 3 Contribution to total CDF
Conclusions
The results in this study showed that the degree of the overestimation by UBA method becomes larger when there are more redundancy in the systems such as the safety mitigation function. Since the reactors with the latest design or the 4th generation reactors tend to have more redundant systems than the current reactors for safety, the effect of overestimation could be more significant.
The results also showed that there are some replacements in the higher ranking of accident sequences due to UBA method, although CDF at the seismic ground motion level where the difference between 2 methods are not so significant contributes to the total CDF the most. The replacement could be significant when the plant is placed in the site where big earthquake is expected periodically, or when the plant is old and is not designed and improved with the earthquake-resistant construction.
In near future, seismic PSA would be conducted frequently to know how to reduce the "Residual Risk," and decisions to reduce the "Residual Risk" would be made based on the result of seismic PSA. But wrong decisions could be made for reactor safety when the important accident sequences are misunderstood due to the overestimation from analytical method.. It is important to consider how to avoid the overestimation and which to select analytical method for the actual applications. the overall development of the SECOM2 code, and many researchers who supported seismic PSA researching project in JAEA. We also received generous advice about seismic PSA from Dr. Loh of ABS Consulting, Inc. The authors express their sincerely thanks to these contributors.
